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The Economic Impacts of Social Activism in Food Markets 
Private politics, usually led by nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and social activists, focuses 
on changing the behavior of private economic 
agents through social pressure rather than 
through government action (although govern-
ment action is also possible) (Baron, 2003). The 
food sector has been experiencing increased social 
pressure from social activist organizations to 
achieve diverse goals, ranging from improving 
food safety and food fortification to increasing 
transparency in food markets. A primary reason 
for the increase in organized activism in the food 
sector is the proliferation of the provision of cre-
dence attributes which are attributes unobserva-
ble through search or experience (consumption 
and use). The majority of these credence attrib-
utes are related to a product’s production process 
(e.g., raised without antibiotics, GMO free, gluten 
free, fair trade) and their provision is not mandat-
ed by the government but instead firms choose to 
‘self-regulate’ and voluntarily provide them to 
appeal to consumers who value them. The volun-
tary provision and the lack of well-defined stand-
ards for many of these attributes (e.g., claims that 
the product is 100% natural, ethically produced or 
produced in a socially responsible manner) create 
an opportunity for the emergence of fraudulent 
behavior which often takes the form of firms 
making false or misleading claims about its 
product’s quality.  
There are numerous examples where social activ-
ist organizations such as the Changing Markets 
Foundation, the Organic Consumers Association 
(OCA), SumOfUs and Greenpeace, have exerted  




Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average       
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . .  . * * 107.00 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . . 156.18 162.21 159.57 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. . 150.88 150.60 148.72 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217.93 222.12 211.74 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 59.30 62.11 64.30 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76.74 79.83 96.99 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . . 139.55 129.87 160.11  
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403.37 424.93 440.83 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices       
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Southwest NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.74 NA 5.12 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Central NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 3.74 NA 3.80 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Central NE, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 8.41 NA 9.89 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Southeast NE, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.02 NA 4.85 
White Oats, No.1/2, Bulk 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.09 2.96 3.13 
Feed       
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . * NA NA 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107.50 NA NA 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 95.00 NA NA 
NADried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147.50 151.00 168.20 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52.50 44.08 50.67 
 ⃰  No Market       
social pressure on food firms, who, according to these 
activists, have made false and/or misleading claims 
about their products and/or business practices. These 
organized social activist groups often collaborate with 
different players in the markets such as competitors of 
the firms they target, research organizations and 
NGOs and conduct research to identify irresponsible 
corporate practices. Based on this research, the activ-
ists may decide to launch campaigns, which are orga-
nized series of events, to fulfill desired goals. Cam-
paign documents reveal that activist organizations 
whose primary goal is to remove false and misleading 
claims will initially make demands on the target firm 
to remove these claims. If the target firm rejects these 
demands, then the activists will exert social pressure 
which can take multiple forms, such as, (1) harming 
the reputation of the firm with name and shame cam-
paigns that publicize the activists’ research findings, 
(2) signing petitions, (3) encouraging citizens to vote 
on a referendum to repeal existing legislature, (4) call-
ing for boycotts of the firm’s products or (5) even dis-
rupting the regular activities of the firm by protesting 
outside their offices.  
A recent example of social activism in food markets is 
the launch of the “Busting the Myth” campaign 
against Nestle, which is one of the global leaders in 
the infant milk formula market, by the Changing 
Markets Foundation and the International Baby Food 
Action Network (IBFAN). The objective of the cam-
paign was to remove misleading and false claims 
made by Nestle with regard to the various infant milk 
formulas and to ensure that Nestle improved their 
standards by removing harmful content from their 
products. Specifically, the activists argued that Nestle 
made contradictory claims about the benefits and po-
tential harm of sucrose and vanilla compounds in in-
fant milk formula. For instance, while the company 
advised against giving sucrose and vanilla in Brazil 
and Hong Kong, its infant milk formula sold in Africa 
did contain sucrose. The campaign also accused the 
company of making false claims about its product be-
ing ‘closest to breastmilk’ and thereby, breaking estab-
lished standards set by the World Health Organiza-
tion. 
Similarly, the OCA launched “The Myth of the Natu-
ral Food” campaign where the main objective was to 
remove natural label claims. OCA argues that when 
firms such as Nature Valley, Post Shredded Wheat 
and Sioux Honey Association use the claim natural  
for their products, consumers automatically equate 
natural to organic, which provides the opportunity 
to mislead consumers for economic gains. OCA 
has also directed social pressure on Tyson for mak-
ing misleading claims that it is following socially 
responsible practices.  
The success of activist campaigns depends, to a 
great extent, on support from the public. 
GlobeScan’s Trust in Institutions surveys show that 
NGOs rank highest in public trust compared to the 
United Nations, large local companies, national 
governments, and global companies, in that order 
(Baron, 2012). Given the increased presence of so-
cial activist organizations in the food sector and the 
rise of large-scale organized campaigns, it is im-
portant to analyze the economic impacts of their 
presence in food markets. Researchers in the De-
partment of Agricultural Economics at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska-Lincoln are examining the eco-
nomic impacts of the presence of activists who ex-
ert social pressure with the objective of removing 
false and misleading claims when well-defined 
standards for the credence attributes provided by 
food firms do not exist. The credence nature of the 
food product attributes and the lack of well-defined 
standards create an informational asymmetry be-
tween the firm and other parties (e.g., consumers, 
regulators, activists) that the firm may choose to 
exploit. The removal of false and misleading claims 
by food firms can have important welfare implica-
tions for both consumers and producers. The study 
derives the conditions under which an activist will 
be effective in removing misleading and false 
claims and provides insights as to how the presence 
of private politics in food markets affects market 
outcomes and the welfare of agents along the sup-
ply chain when the activist is effective as well as 
when they are ineffective or incorrectly target a 
firm.  
Specifically, the study develops a game-theoretic 
framework that includes the following players: two 
firms – a self-regulator that provides a credence 
attribute and a profit maximizer that provides a 
basic good – a continuum of heterogeneous con-
sumers and a confrontational activist. Consumers 
value the credence attribute, but they differ in their 
strength of preference for it, and they revise their 
perceived quality valuation of the firm’s product if 
the firm is targeted by the activist (this accounts for  
the reputational harm faced by the targeted firm if the 
activist’s campaign succeeds). The activist values mar-
ket transparency, her utility decreases in the discrep-
ancy between the quality the firm produces and the 
claims it makes about this quality and receives utility 
from targeting the firm. The self-regulating firm de-
cides on the level of quality of the credence attribute it 
will supply in the market and the claims it will make 
about this quality.  
Study results show that even in the presence of an ac-
tivist who always monitors the firm and accurately 
identifies discrepancies between the firm’s actual and 
claimed quality, there are conditions under which a 
self-regulating firm has an incentive to misrepresent 
its true quality. The greater is the effectiveness of the 
activist and the reputational harm the firm faces if the 
activist’s campaign succeeds, the less likely it is that 
the firm will misrepresent its true quality. Interesting-
ly, results show that if the firm finds it optimal to mis-
represent its quality, the presence of the activist does 
not affect the outrageousness of the firm’s claims. 
However, the presence of the activist can alter the  
optimal quality the firm actually produces and 
supplies n the market; the optimal quality is great-
er when the activist is present in the market than 
when she is absent. This occurs because by choos-
ing a greater quality, the firm can strategically alter 
the activist’s incentive to target the firm and the 
probability that a campaign, if launched, will be 
successful. Finally, results show that while the ac-
tivist can play an important role in increasing mar-
ket transparency resulting in significant welfare 
gains for consumers, a benevolent yet ineffective 
activist can lead to welfare losses that may be 
greater than those present when the activist is ab-
sent and consumers are uninformed. 
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